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Abstract 
Compared with traditional machine learning models, deep neural networks perform better, 
especially in image classification tasks. However, they are vulnerable to adversarial examples. 
Adding small perturbations on examples causes a good-performance model to misclassify the 
crafted examples, without category differences in the human eyes, and fools deep models 
successfully. There are two requirements for generating adversarial examples: the attack 
success rate and image fidelity metrics. Generally, perturbations are increased to ensure the 
adversarial examples’ high attack success rate; however, the adversarial examples obtained 
have poor concealment. To alleviate the tradeoff between the attack success rate and image 
fidelity, we propose a method named AdvJND, adding visual model coefficients, just 
noticeable difference coefficients, in the constraint of a distortion function when generating 
adversarial examples. In fact, the visual subjective feeling of the human eyes is added as a 
priori information, which decides the distribution of perturbations, to improve the image 
quality of adversarial examples. We tested our method on the FashionMNIST, CIFAR10, and 
MiniImageNet datasets. Our adversarial examples keep high image quality under slightly 
decreasing attack success rate. Since our AdvJND algorithm yield gradient distributions that 
are similar to those of the original inputs, the crafted noise can be hidden in the original inputs, 
improving the attack concealment significantly. 
1. Introduction 
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are effective for completing many important but difficult tasks 
like computer vision [1-4], nature language processing [5-8], etc., and can achieve state-of-the-
art performances in these tasks. Furthermore, they have approached human levels of 
performance in some specific tasks. Thus, we can assume that artificial intelligence is moving 
toward human intelligence step by step. However, Szegedy made an intriguing discovery: 
DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples [9]; he first proposed the concept of adversarial 
examples in image classification. A good-performance DNN model misclassify inputs 
modified by adding small, imperceptible perturbations, which is hard to distinguish for humans. 
And adversarial examples are used to attack such applications like face recognition[10, 11], 
autonomous driving car [12, 13] and malware detection [14]. Obviously, adversarial examples 
are blind spots of deep models. The problem of generating adversarial examples can be 
regarded as an optimization problem, in which the target perturbations are minimized when the 
predicted label is not equal to the true label. The mathematical formula is decribed as follows: 
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 (1) 
Let x  be the input to the model, r  the perturbation,  ,D x x r the distortion function 
between adversarial examples and their original inputs, and  f x   the predicted label of the 
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model. As shown in formula (1), there are two requirements for generating adversarial 
examples. One is to generate a misclassified example to attack successfully, and the other is to 
generate the smallest possible distortion value. These requirements ensure that the adversarial 
examples are similar to the original inputs and that high image fidelity is guaranteed. Because 
of the security threat of DNNs, adversarial examples have garnered significant attention among 
researchers, especially in the security critical applications. Classic methods for generating 
adversarial examples on deep learning have been established. Based on the adversarial setting 
criteria to sort, white-box attack represents to directly acquire all information, like training 
datasets, model architecture and so on. However, black-box attack means to get information 
by querying model indirectly. And the proposed methods usually use the pL norm ( 0L , 2L , L ) 
to classify the adversarial examples, which is used for constraining the perturbations. That is, 
in the definition of the distortion function  ,D x x r , the pL  norm is used as a distance metric 
to measure the similarity between the adversarial examples and the original inputs. Typically, 
Jiawei Su et al. [15] proposed the one pixel attack method with the 0L  norm constraint, which 
changes by only one or several pixels [16, 17] in a picture but results in a significant changes 
compared with the original image of the poor attack concealment with obvious altered traces. 
Additionally, a lower attack success rate is resulted. Szegedy et al. proposed a method to 
generate adversarial examples with box-constrained L-BFGS [9] via back-propagation to 
obtain gradient information. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. proposed a method to search the minimum 
perturbations to a classified boundary, named DeepFool [18], with the high images fidelity and 
attack success rates. Both of them take the 2L  norm constraint, which interferes the entire 
picture. Adversarial examples which satisfy the 2L  norm constraint are similar to the original 
inputs [18, 19]. However, it is time consuming to generate adversarial examples, which is 
inefficient. Goodfellow et al. proposed the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [20] with the L
norm constraint, which fastly generates adversarial examples by maximizing the loss function, 
with low image fidelity and attack success rate. Furthermore, Kurakin Alexey et al. proposed 
an iterative fast gradient sign method (I-FGSM) [21] to improve FGSM.  
We herein mainly discuss the L norm constraint, restraining the maximum distance 
difference between the adversarial example and the original input. Generally, perturbations are 
increased to ensure the adversarial examples’ high attack success rate; however, the adversarial 
examples obtained in this manner exhibit poor concealment. To alleviate the tradeoff between 
the attack success rate and image fidelity, we propose a method that adds visual model 
coefficients in the L  norm constraint. Because the L  norm constraint is an objective metric, 
the distribution of perturbation is disordered and some noisy pixels are sensitive to the human 
eyes. Sid Ahmed Fezza et al. [22] thought the pL  norm did not correlate with human judgement 
and were not suitable as a distance metric. Adil Kaan Akan et al. [23] defined the machine’s 
just noticeable difference with regularization terms, other than just noticeable difference of 
human visual perception. And they generated just noticeable difference adversarial examples, 
which attacked successfully just right. Different from that, we take the visual model 
coefficients into consideration, and think it can be added in the constraint to improve the images 
quality and guarantee high image fidelity. In fact, the visual subjective feeling of the human 
eyes is added as a priori information in the constraint to control the distribution of perturbations. 
In our study, we integrate the just noticeable difference (JND) coefficients into the L norm 
constraint of the distortion function to complete above attentioned task. 
 3
JND coefficients are critical values at which a difference can be detected. Additionally, 
they reflect that the human eyes can recognize the threshold of an image change. In general, 
the JND model is applied in image encoding. There exists redundancy in images, which without 
de-redundancy would be transported with lower efficiency. And JND could determine the 
amount of tolerated distortions to guarantee the quality of the images. Image encoding with 
JND coefficients can improve coding efficiency significantly [24-26], called perceptual coding. 
In this study, we used the JND model of the image domain to hide noise. As shown in Figure 
1, after adding Gaussian noise with a variance of 0.01 in the original input, the image is 
significantly interfered. When we constrain the noise with JND coefficients to control the 
distribution of noise, a human visual system (HVS) cannot distinguish the difference between 
the original input and the JND image, which proves the noise concealment ability of JND 
coefficients. 
 
Figure 1. JND coefficients hide Gaussian noise. Left column：the original image. Middle column: the Gaussian 
noise image. Right column: the JND image. 
JND coefficients can hide Gaussian noise because a region with large JND coefficients is 
a region with complex image textures. Additionally, it is difficult for our HVS to notice these 
changes in these regions, which are also called visual blind spots of the human eyes. The larger 
the JND coefficients, the higher are the thresholds, the greater is the redundancy, the smaller 
is the sensitivity of the human eyes, and the more noise can be embedded. Therefore, 
perturbations in regions with large JND coefficients are less likely to be detected. We integrate 
JND coefficients into the existing adversarial attack methods. Namely, we add JND 
coefficients to the L norm constraint and define this method as AdvJND. The primarily 
contributions of this study are as follows: 
(1) We suggest a method to integrate JND coefficients for generating adversarial examples. 
We add the visual subjective feeling of the human eyes as a priori information in the constraint 
to decide the distribution of perturbations and generate adversarial examples with gradients 
distribution similar to that of the original inputs. Hence, the crafted noise can be hidden in the 
original inputs, thus improving the attack concealment significantly. 
(2) We demonstrate that generating adversarial examples with our algorithm costs less time 
than algorithms with the 2L  norm constraint like DeepFool, when the image quality and the 
attack success rate of their methods are approximate. Such fact proves that our AdvJND 
algorithm is more efficient. 
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In Section 2, we provide the implementation algorithm of AdvJND. The effects of 
AdvJND are shown in Section 3. In Section 4, we draw the conclusions. 
2. Methodology 
In our AdvJND algorithm, we should get some information in advance, like the original 
image’s JND coefficients and the original perturbations from the target model’s gradients. 
Hence, we compute the JND coefficients in Section 2.1, and adopt FGSM and I-FGSM 
methods to yield the original perturbations in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we introduce the 
complete AdvJND algorithm. 
2.1 JND Coefficients 
The JND coefficients are based on the representation of visual redundancy in psychology and 
physiology. The receiver of image information is the HVS. A JND spatial model in the image 
domain primarily includes two factors: luminance masking and texture masking. On one hand, 
according to the Weber’s law, the luminance contrast of perception in HVS increases with the 
practical’s luminance. On the other hand, since the complex texture area and excess noises are 
both high-frequency information, so that excess noises could be hided in the texture area easily. 
To better match the HVS characteristics, X. K. Yang [27] designed a nonlinear additive model 
for masking to give consideration to both luminance adaption and texture. And texture masking 
is determined by the average background luminance and the average luminance difference 
around a pixel [28, 29]. The JND coefficient of each pixel is obtained experimentally [27]. The 
formula is  
          1 2, max , , , , , .jnd i j f bg i j mg i j f i j  (2) 
Where  1 ,f i j  is the texture masking function,  2 ,f i j  is the luminance adaption function, 
 ,bg i j  and  ,mg i j  represent gradient changes of the average background luminance and 
neighboring points at point  ,i j , respectively. 
Due to the visual redundancy in the image, there is a chance to embed noises in it. 
Furthermore, it is necessary for us to determine the magnitude of embedding noises to 
guarantee imperceptibility. Luckily, JND coefficients is related with HVS’s sensitivity and 
helpful to embedding noises without perceptibility, which improves the attack concealment. 
2.2 Adversarial Attack Methods 
The paper is based on the white-box adversarial attack setting, instead of Curls & Whey [30], 
which concerntrates on improving adversarial image quality under the same query times in 
black-box setting.  
In this section, we review the related studies of adversarial attack. We primarily introduce 
the FGSM and its extended algorithm I-FGSM and obtain the original perturbations from them. 
And our method performs improvements based on the FGSM and I-FGSM. The reason why 
we choose I-FGSM as a baseline is that I-FGSM is the state-of-the-art white-box attack based 
on L norm constraint. 
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FGSM.  The basic concept of the FGSM [20] is to optimize in the direction of increasing loss 
function, i.e., generating adversarial examples in the positive direction of the gradient. It 
exhibits two characteristics. One is that it generates adversarial examples fast, as it only 
performs one back-propagation without iteration. Another is that it measures the distance 
between the adversarial example and the original input using the L . These are the two main 
reasons for the obvious perturbations. 
   , , .xp sign J x y     (3) 
 advx x p   (4) 
Where   represents the upper limit of perturbation,  x J   represents the gradient value of 
the loss function to the original input via back-propagation, p represents the perturbation, x
represents the original input, and advx  represents the generated adversarial example. 
I-FGSM.  The I-FGSM [21] is the expansion of the FGSM, which computes perturbations 
iteratively instead of in a one-shot manner. Specifically, a   single  value that changes in the 
direction of the gradient sign is replaced by a smaller   value; subsequently, the upper limit 
of the perturbation   is used as limiting the constraint. 
 0 .
advx x  (5) 
     ,lip min 1, ,max , .xC x x x x      (6) 
    1 , , , .adv advt x t xx Clip x sign J x y        (7) 
The I-FGSM achieves adversarial examples of better image quality than the one-shot FGSM.  
Meanwhile it implies more time costs. 
2.3 AdvJND Methods 
First, we are to calculate the JND coefficients of the original input and then normalize the 
processed JND coefficients to the L . Specifically, we normalize the original input pixels to 
[0,1], and calculate the JND coefficients on each channel independently to simplify the 
calculation. Although the JND coefficients can reflect the edge information to some extent, for 
a more obvious edge area and a better discrimination, we calculate the power values of the JND 
coefficients, which allow large values to become larger, and small values to become smaller, 
that is, values representing edge areas are dramatically larger than smooth areas. In this paper, 
we square the image’s JND coefficients. 
 2 .jnd jnd jnd   (8) 
On the other hand, after squaring, the obtained JND coefficients are close to the order of 
1e-3. If perturbations added are directly controlled at 1e-3 or similar, it would be difficult to 
attack the image successfully although the perturbations obey the image’s gradient distribution. 
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Thus, we discard the absolute values of the JND coefficients instead of their relative values, 
that is, we take JND coefficients to control the distribution of perturbations indirectly. 
 
 2
.
max
orip
jnd
   (9) 
 2.k jnd   (10) 
orip  represents the original perturbations from the FGSM or I-FGSM method, represents 
the scaled value, and k is the JND coefficients’ relative values, which provide the critical 
information of the image texture location. Although the obtained adversarial examples are 
similar to the original inputs, their attack success rates are still lower than original adversarial 
examples’. In most cases, the large values of k primarily locate in the regions with complex 
textures, in which noise can be hided efficiently, and the small values of k locate in the smooth 
areas, in which our HVS are sensitive and easy to notice. Therefore, we decide the final values 
of k based on the location information. And our strategy is to reduce the small values of k in 
multiplies and calculate the final perturbations as follows. 
 
1,
.
,
t if k
t if k

 
 

 
 (11) 
 .outp k t   (12) 
We obtained the experience value experimentally. The threshold value 
2

  , the 
reduced multiple 
1
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  , and outp  represents the final adversarial perturbations. The AdvJND 
method is summarized in Algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 1 takes the FGSM method as an example to show the complete process of our 
AdvJND algorithm to generate adversarial examples. If we implement our AdvJND algorithm 
based on the I-FGSM method, take the output advx  as the input  , and repeat the procedures 
from step 3 to step 9 until satisfying the minimum condition or the maximum iterations. 
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Algorithm 1 AdvJND: restrain JND coefficients to L  norm 
1 input: an image x，superior limit  . 
2 output: an adversarial example advx . 
3 Computer JND coefficients of the image x  
         1 2, max , , , , , .jnd i j f bg i j mg i j f i j  
4 Calculate the original perturbations  orip  
  , , .xp sign J x y     
5 Square JND coefficients  
2 .jnd jnd jnd   
6 Normalize JND coefficients to L  norm 
  22
.
max
oripk jnd
jnd
   
7 Set threshold 
1,
.
,
t if k
t if k

 
 

 
 
8 Obtain Perturbations outp  
.outp k t   
9 Get the final adversarial example 
adv
outx x p   
10 return advx  
3. Experiments 
In this section, experiments on the FashionMNIST [31], CIFAR10 [32], and MiniImageNet 
datasets (using 1000 images from ILSVR2012 [33] test dataset, 1925 pictures in total, and the 
reason why we take the MiniImageNet dataset is that it can not guarantee the high recognition 
accuracy in classification tasks with the whole ImageNet dataset, and in order to show the 
effectiveness of our attack algorithm, we validate the MiniImageNet with high accuarcy.) are 
used to validate our AdvJND method, and these datasets correspond to network architectures 
LeNet-5 [34], VGG16 [35], and Inception_v3 [36], respectively. We demonstrate the 
advantages of the FGSM-JND and I-FGSM-JND algorithms over the original attack methods 
in Section 3.1. And the proposed AdvJND algorithm adopts a general approach of the L  
constraint to generate adversarial examples. In Section 3.2, we compare the efficiency between 
the I-FGSM-JND and DeepFool algorithms. 
3.1 AdvJND 
The core of AdvJND is integrating JND coefficients into the L constraint, i.e., using the visual 
subjective feeling of the human eyes as priori information to control the distribution of 
perturbations. More similar adversarial examples are generated though the attack success rate 
slightly decreases within an acceptable range. 
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3.1.1 FGSM vs. FGSM-JND 
 
Figure 2. FGSM vs. FGSM-JND on the FashionMNIST dataset. 
The FGSM-JND is obtained by integrating JND coefficients into the FGSM. As shown in 
Figure 2, the perturbations generated by the FGSM are distributed over the entire image, but 
the perturbations generated by the FGSM-JND are distributed over the edge region of the 
“pants”. The adversarial examples generated by FGSM are rough and modified obviously, but 
the adversarial examples generated by our algorithm are smooth and more similar to the 
original inputs, since our FGSM-JND algorithm can effectively control perturbations in such 
smooth regions with the location of small JND coefficients and mainly hide noise in regions 
with the location of large JND coefficients to ensure its adversarial capacity.  
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3.1.2 I-FGSM vs. I-FGSM-JND 
 
Figure 3. I-FGSM vs. I-FGSM-JND on the MiniImageNet dataset. 
The I-FGSM-JND is obtained by integrating JND coefficients into the I-FGSM. In Figure 3, 
the I-FGSM generates more obvious perturbations, especially in the smooth background region. 
However, the perturbations generated by the I-FGSM-JND primarily focus on regions of 
complex texture in the images (e.g., the “bird” in row 1), which is not sensitive to the HVS, 
and perturbations in it cannot be detected easily. And even in smooth regions like the body of 
the “bird”, our I-FGSM-JND generates smaller and fewer perturbations in such regions. 
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           Figure 4. Histograms of oriented gradients generated by the original inputs, I-FGSM, and I-FGSM-JND 
in Figure 3. 
From a different perspective, we can explain this phenomenon with the histograms of oriented 
gradients (HOG) [37], which is a feature descriptor of an image and reflects outline and texture 
information of an image. We herein configure the HOG basic settings with 8 orientations, 
16 16 pixels per cell and 1 1 cell per block. In Figure 4, even though the HOG of the 
adversarial examples (e.g., still the “bird” in row 1) generated by the I-FGSM-JND can mainly 
be perturbed by a small noise texture in the background, the outline of “bird” can be recognized. 
By contrast, FGSM-JND’s adversarial examples are covered with noise but cannot be 
recognized, that is, all the magnitudes and directions of textures are messy and even we can’t 
distinguish the target and background. On the other hand, the HOG descriptors of the “bird” in 
row 2 and the “dog” in row 3 are clearer than that of the “bird” in row 1, especially in the 
background regions. It is most likely that the background in row 1 is more complex, where 
JND coefficients is larger and we can add more noise. The texture complexity reflects the 
information of the edge, which is related with gradient. Thus, the gradients distribution of 
adversarial examples generated by the I-FGSM-JND is more similar to those of the image 
inputs. 
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3.1.3 Original Methods vs. Improvement Methods 
 
 
Figure 5. Ten adversarial examples were generated by the FGSM, FGSM-JND, I-FGSM, and I-FGSM-JND  
with epsilon 0.1; their local enlarged images on the MiniImageNet dataset are shown on the right orderly. 
 
In Figure 5, we select 10 adversarial examples randomly and enlarge their local regions 
(marked by a red box in the same place) to see more information in detail. For example, in row 
8, we enlarge the sky to observe. The FGSM method generates distinct perturbations and the 
I-FGSM can produce more refined perturbations by iterating the FGSM method, which also 
proves that it is useful to iterate. To our surprise, integrating JND coefficients into the constraint, 
we can get smaller perturbations than the I-FGSM method. For all images, we can conclude 
that our AdvJND algorithm improves the image quality obviously, especially in smooth regions 
with simple texture. And I-FGSM-JND algorithm performs best. There is no doubt that it works 
when we take the JND coefficients as a priori information to control the distribution of 
gradients. 
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Table 1. Comparison of recognition accuracy between the original attack and AdvJND attack on the 
FashionMNIST, CIFAR 10, and MiniImageNet datasets. 
Attack Methods Epsilon 
FashionMNIST/
LeNet5 
CIFAR10/
VGG16 
MiniImageNet/
Inception_v3 
Non-attack 0.0 92.33 83.4 97.82 
FGSM 
0.2 
12.94 9.02 43.64 
FGSM-JND 29.48 9.22 58.49 
I-FGSM 5.69 7.51 1.3 
I-FGSM-JND 16.57 7.52 2.44 
 
As shown in Table 1, the non-attack method means taking the original images as inputs 
without epsilon, and the attack success rate, namely (1-recognition accuracy), of the AdvJND 
algorithm is lower than or equivalent to that of the original attack method, which sacrifices a 
little attack success rates to improve the images fidelity. This is especially obvious in the FGSM 
and FGSM-JND. Because the FGSM is a one-step attack method, its effect on the attack 
success rate is larger than that on the image fidelity, which leads the gap of the attack success 
rate between the FGSM and FGSM-JND a little large. And by iterating, the attack success rate 
is higher and the image fidelity becomes better, meanwhile, the gap of the attack success rate 
between the I-FGSM and I-FGSM-JND decreases. 
On the other hand, the performance of the FashionMNIST dataset, whether the attack 
success rate or the gap of the attack success rate between the original attack algorithm and our 
AdvJND algorithm, is worse than other datasets. It can be considered that the improvement 
effect of our AdvJND algorithm is a little critical about images because the JND coefficients 
are related to the the texture complexity of the image. However, such FashionMNIST dataset 
prefers simple textures and smooth backgrounds, and the MiniImageNet dataset includes more 
practical images in our real life with more complex textures. We know that the function of the 
JND coefficients are small in smooth images and the effects of the JND coefficients are not 
obvious, which explains why our AdvJND algorithm performs better on the MiniImageNet and 
CIFAR10 datasets than the FashionMNIST dataset. 
3.1.4 Epsilon in AdvJND 
The epsilon is crucial for improving the attack success rate. In this section, we present the 
attack success rate and image fidelity of AdvJND attacks by changing the epsilon value. 
When the epsilon increases from 0.01 to 0.2, the attack success rate improves, too. 
Simultaneously, the gap between the I-FGSM and I-FGSM-JND decreases gradually. When 
the epsilon is 0.2, the difference in the attack success rate between the I-FGSM and I-FGSM-
JND is less than 0.009. However, in terms of image quality (in Figure 6), the adversarial 
examples generated by the I-FGSM with epsilon 0.01 and those by the I-FGSM-JND with 
epsilon 0.2 with higher attack success rate are similar. 
Therefore, adversarial examples generated by AdvJND are more similar to the original 
inputs when the attack success rates of the original attack and AdvJND attack are equivalent. 
In other words, by embedding the a priori information of the human eyes’ subjective feeling, 
the algorithm based on AdvJND attack is more effective for alleviating the tradeoff between 
the attack success rate and image fidelity and achieves to generate adversarial examples with 
more higher image quality. 
 13
 
Figure 6. Adversarial examples generated by the I-FGSM and I-FGSM-JND with epsilon 0.01, 0.08, and 0.2 
3.2 I-FGSM-JND vs. DeepFool 
In Figure 7, the adversarial examples generated by the I-FGSM-JND (with epsilon 0.08) and 
DeepFool are similar. The attack success rate of the I-FGSM-JND algorithm is slightly higher 
than that of DeepFool, but the average of time consuming for the I-FGSM-JND algorithm to 
generate an adversarial example is approximately only half that of the DeepFool (in Table 2). 
The times are computed using a Nvidia GTX 1080Ti GPU. This is because DeepFool takes the 
smallest distance to the nearest classification boundary as the minimum perturbations. So it 
must traverse the classification boundary and obtain the smallest distance. In case of the 
situation of 1000 classes, the disadvantage of time-consuming will be more obvious. Thus, the 
efficiency of the I-FGSM-JND algorithm is significantly higher than that of DeepFool, and the 
I-FGSM-JND is more suitable as a universal attack method. 
 
 
Figure 7. I-FGSM-JND vs. DeepFool on the MiniImageNet dataset. 
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Table 2. The efficiency of generating adversarial examples with the I-FGSM and DeepFool. 
Method 
Attack Success 
Rate (%) 
Average Time of Generating an 
Adversarial Example(s) 
I-FGSM-JND 97.45 0.7 
DeepFool 96.36 1.41 
 
Similar to integrating the JND coefficients in the    norm, the subjective visual 
information of the human eyes is used as a priori information to improve the image quality of 
the adversarial examples. Furthermore, we can consider to embed the appropriate visual model 
coefficients into the    norm constraint as a priori information which can provide a better 
search strategy or reduce the search space to decrease the iteration or traversal times to improve 
the efficiency. 
4. Conclusions 
Large perturbations lead the adversarial examples’ high attack success rate and bad image 
fidelity with poor concealment. To alleviate the tradeoff between the attack success rate and 
image fidelity, we herein proposed an adversarial attack method using AdvJND and used JND 
coefficients to relate the subjective feeling of human eyes and the image quality evaluation 
metric. The human eyes are not sensitive to changes in complex texture regions, which provides 
a chance for us to embed more noise in these regions. Our experimental results demonstrated 
that the HOG descriptors of adversarial examples generated by the AdvJND algorithm were 
similar to those of the original inputs; thus, noise could be hidden effectively in the original 
inputs. Our approach can be incorporated into the new proposed L norm-based attack method 
to build adversarial examples that are similar to the original inputs. In future work, other 
metrics of human visual evaluation can be integrated into the 2L  norm constraint to improve 
the efficiency of generating adversarial examples. 
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